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Supervisory governance
The case of the Dutch Consumer Authority
Michiel A. Heldeweg1 
The scope of the proposed regulation is limited to cross-border infringements. Therefore
the Member States are not required to change their arrangements for domestic infringe-
ments by this regulation.2
1. Introduction
This contribution concerns the multilevel and multi-actor governance of supervision. It focuses
on the establishment, in the Netherlands, of a new Consumer Authority. This public Authority
is particularly interesting as it is equipped to fit in with existing civil law and self-regulatory
mechanisms to uphold consumer protection, while at the same time it has administrative law
instruments that have been newly added to the tool-box of consumer protection law. Furthermore,
the Consumer Authority is to act as a partner in the European network of national consumer
authorities, whereas, on the other hand, nationally it needs to coordinate its efforts with other
public supervisory agencies and with private consumers’ organisations.
The leading question in this contribution is how this new supervisory governance-structure, that
is largely a response to the EC Regulation on consumer protection cooperation (in short Rcpc),3
is to operate, especially with regard to: (a) the concurrence of and coordination between (self-
regulatory) civil law safeguards and (command & control) administrative law instruments, and
(b) the locus or loci of responsibility for supervision. 
First, we will address the relevant regulatory framework; starting with some remarks on the
previously mentioned Rcpc, followed by some comparative notes and concluding with an
overview of the Dutch draft Act on the Enforcement of Consumer Protection (AECP).4 Then we
will attempt to characterise the Dutch Consumer Authority in terms of its supervisory and
enforcement tasks. Subsequently, the leading question will be subject to further scrutiny, with
the two aspects as mentioned above (a. and b.). Finally, an attempt will be made to draw some
conclusions, which may add to our understanding of the governance of supervision, especially
with regard to the multi-actor and multilevel aspects. 
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2. The legal framework
2.1. The Rcpc (EC Regulation on consumer protection cooperation)
The main objective of the Rcpc, which is also relevant in an EEA context, is the cooperation
between national authorities and between national authorities and the European Commission.5
The key to cooperation is the concept of mutual assistance.6 In the wording of the Explanatory
Memorandum to the Rcpc, ‘The proposal provides a framework of mutual assistance rights and
obligations for enforcement authorities to use when dealing with cross-border infringements. The
resulting network is designed to give national enforcement authorities an enforcement solution
to deal quickly with the most serious rogue traders.’7
Mutual assistance
There are two types of assistance; a request from a foreign consumer authority for an exchange
of information (Art. 6 Rcpc) and a request from a foreign consumer authority to take enforcement
measures (Art. 8 Rcpc). Both requests are sent by the applicant authority via its own single
liaisons office to the single liaisons office of the requested authority, which forwards the request
to the requested authority.8 The requested authority ‘shall supply’ (without delay) any relevant
information, respectively ‘shall take all necessary enforcement measures’ (for the cessation or
prohibition of an infringement). However, discretion concerning the effectiveness, efficiency and
proportionality of the requested response, in the case of sanctions, remains with the requested
consumer authority.9 The requested consumer authority can ask other public offices to assist in
responding properly to the applicant’s request,10 but it can also seek assistance from ‘bodies with
legitimate interest’.11 
Substantive law & competences
Cooperation between national authorities is within the scope of EC laws, regulations and
directives which protect consumers’ interests. On the basis of Article 3, under a Rcpc, this scope
is limited to those transposed directives and regulations listed in the Annex. 
With regard to the relevant directives it is only the transposition thereof into national law which
requires supervision and enforcement under the Rcpc. This implies that national authorities must
sometimes execute foreign law. Sharing knowledge about the domestic law of 28 countries and
understanding the pertinent differences is therefore of great importance. This is where the
network can play an important role.12 
This is also where one needs to realise that the applicability of both procedural and substantive
national law will require recourse to (private) international law, as the Rcpc does not offer
guidelines for determining, in specific cases of infringement, in which country and according to
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13 Ibid.
14 Ibid, p. 10.
15 Provisions with regard to the communications between national authorities and between these authorities, Member States and the Commission
will be further discussed below (Section 4.2).
16 Art. 2.3, Para. 1 AECP, supra note 4..
17 See Art. 8, Para. 3 Rcpc, supra note 3. This instruction is not a transferral of competences – see ECLG, supra note 5, pp. 3-4.
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which substantive law enforcement should take place.13 The relevance of this becomes clear if
we look at Article 3, sub. b Rcpc. This article describes an intra-Community breach as any act
or omission contrary to the laws that protect consumers’ interests, as defined in the regulations
and transposed directives referred to in Article 3, under a Rcpc, ‘that harms, or is likely to harm,
the collective interests of consumers residing in a Member State or Member States other than the
Member State where the act or omission originated or took place; or where the responsible seller
or supplier is established; or where evidence or assets pertaining to the act or omission are to be
found.’ In other words, the place of origin, of establishment and/or of relevant evidence or assets
may be a reason for the consumer authority to undertake action and it may do so in different
national legal contexts concerning supervisory activities and enforcement measures.
The Rcpc expands on Directive 98/27/EC on injunctions for the protection of consumers’
interests. This directive also concerns the possibility for transboundary class actions as imple-
mented in the Netherlands in Article 305c CLC. In as far as this directive enables foreign public
authorities to request an injunction in a foreign court (Art. 3 sub. a), the Rcpc now offers the
possibility for a foreign authority to seek assistance from the domestic authority in taking
enforcement action (whether or not through a court injunction).14
Entities
Finally, for the moment, it needs to be noted that the Rcpc distinguishes the following four types
of national entities (see also Section 2.1 under Supervisory framework):15
1. The ‘competent authority’ (Art. 3, sub. c) – being any public authority within a Member State
having responsibility to enforce ‘the laws that protect consumers’ interests’. In the Nether-
lands, the main competent authority is the newly created Consumer Authority, but, as will be
shown below (in Section 2.3), some competences rest with other, already existing, public
supervisory authorities.
2. The ‘single liaison office’ (Art. 3, sub. d in conjunction with Art. 4, par. 1) – this stands for
the public authority in each Member State which is uniquely designated as being responsible
for coordinating the application of the Rcpc within that Member State. In the Netherlands this
authority rests (exclusively) with the Consumer Authority.16
3. Possible ‘other public authorities’ (Art. 4, Para. 2) – refers to the fact that other public offices,
apart from the ones under 2 and 3, may be involved in supervisory and enforcement activities
as addressed in the Rcpc, not on the basis of competences derived from the Rcpc, but on the
basis of their already nationally attributed competences.
4. ‘Bodies having a legitimate interest in the cessation or prohibition of intra-Community
infringements’ (Art. 4, Para. 2) – points to a similar involvement, but in this case by an entity
outside ‘public office’. The competent authority (as described under 1.) may, upon a request
for assistance from an authority of another Member State, instruct a designated civil law body,
‘to take all necessary enforcement measures available to it under national law to bring about
the cessation or prohibition of the intra-Community infringement on behalf of the requested
authority.’17 
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2.2. Some comparative notes 
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Rcpc acknowledges that the introduction of the Rcpc will
require some changes to the enforcement rules in Member States. It states that ‘Clearly (…) some
Member States will be more affected than others will. A large majority of Member States and
acceding countries nevertheless have public authorities with specific consumer protection
enforcement responsibilities. (…) However no such authorities exist in Germany, the Netherlands
or in Luxembourg. In Austria, Länder authorities have executive authority to impose fines on
traders for breaches of certain laws.’18
No further reference to national differences in supervision and enforcement, inter alia, as to the
choice or coordination between civil law and administrative law enforcement, is made in the
Memorandum.19 The Explanatory Memorandum to the AECP offers some consolation in offering
a concise overview of some basic aspects of the legal regimes for consumer protection in 10
Member States.20 A ‘brief encounter’ with this ‘state of affairs’ prior to the implementation of
the Rcpc is relevant as it places the response by the Dutch government to the Rcpc (discussed
under Section 2.3 and thereafter) within the context of different governance structures for the
supervision of (European) consumer protection law.21
United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom the independent Office for Fair Trading (OFT)22 is responsible for
supervising and enforcing consumer protection and competition laws. The OFT is not involved
in settling individual complaints. In the UK the enforcement of consumer protection laws is a
matter for the courts. The OFT itself is authorised to ask traders to agree to an undertaking to
cease an infringement and to request a court for an enforcement order for the cessation or
prohibition of an infringement.23 Furthermore, the OFT manages the OFT Approved code logo as
a benchmark for service quality, aimed at promoting customer confidence.
Denmark
In Denmark the National Consumer Agency of Denmark (Forbrugerstyrelsen),24 as part of the
Ministry of Family and Consumer Affairs, consists of the Consumer Information Board, the
Consumer Complaints Board (dealing with individual cases) and the Consumer Ombudsman
(dealing mainly with enforcing the Marketing Practices Act). Its objectives are to offer a
coordinated and active contribution in the field of consumer affairs through information and
service activities and to contribute to the creation and maintenance of a high level of consumer
protection. The Ombudsman office enforces certain acts, it can offer advice and can bring cases
to both the civil and criminal courts; it does not hear individual complaints, but it can intervene
in civil proceedings so as to assist the individual complainant.
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27 http://www.finances.gouv.fr/DGCCRF/
28 http://www.agcm.it/eng/index.htm
29 http://www.odca.ie/
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Sweden
In Sweden the Swedish Consumer Agency (Konsumentverket)25 is a state agency of which the
Director-General is also the Consumer Ombudsman. The Agency supervises a broad range of
consumer protection laws. It does not handle individual complaints – this task is left to the
National Board for Consumer Complaints. The Ombudsman can pursue legal action on behalf
of consumer interests, such as a class action. The agency can also issue an administrative order
subject to a penalty, but needs a court order to actually lay claim to the penalty. 
Belgium
In Belgium the general directorate on Control and Consultation,26 as part of the Federal Office
for Public Service Economy, SMEs, Self-employed and Energy, has the objective of protecting
the rights of both consumers and traders. In the case of an infringement, public servants involved
in supervision fall within the responsibility of the public prosecutor. In such a case the Federal
minister can no longer issue administrative orders. All in all, the Belgian enforcement of
consumer protection laws is a matter for civil and criminal law. The directorate may, in specific
cases, withdraw licences, offer an amicable settlement and issue warnings. The criminal and civil
courts can respectively (and simultaneously) impose penal sanctions or order the cessation of a
prohibited activity or an infringement.
France
In France the Direction Générale de la Concurrence, de la Consommation et de la Répression
des Fraudes (CCRF)27 forms part of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Finance and Industry
(MINEFI). By and large, enforcement competences are similar to those in Belgium (except for
being able to offer an amicable settlement). 
Italy
In Italy, the Autorita Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato28 is an independent agency which
is involved in upholding competition law and the prohibition of misleading and comparative
advertising. In the latter area the agency can only act in the collective defence of all consumers,
but only on the basis of one or more individual complaint(s). It will then undertake an investiga-
tion and, if the complaint is found to be justified, it can issue an administrative cessation or a
prohibition order. It may also order the advertiser to publish a statement rectifying the inaccurate
advertisement. If the advertiser fails to comply with the instructions of the Authority, it is liable
to an administrative fine. A ruling by the Authority that an advertisement is misleading never
leads to the payment of damages to the complainant for any loss or damage suffered. This can
only be obtained by means of a request before the courts.
Ireland
In Ireland the Office of Directors of Consumer affairs (ODCA)29 is an independent agency
responsible for giving advice and information to consumers and for enforcing several consumer
protection laws. It does not handle individual complaints, but it can enforce compliance with
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(http://www.bvl.bund.de/EN/Home/homepage__node.html)
31 E.M.(Rcpc), supra note 2, under no. 36. As we will see, the Dutch government did not share this point of view.
32 E.M.(AECP), supra note 4, p. 2.
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consumer protection laws through the prosecution of offences and by seeking orders at the civil
(High) court.
Germany, Luxembourg, Austria and the Netherlands
As was stated above, in Germany, Luxembourg, Austria and the Netherlands there were no
national consumer authorities prior to the Rcpc.30 
Overview
Even with this overview of just 11 Member States, there clearly seems to be quite some variety
in Member States’ consumer protection laws. The most relevant points for the purposes of this
contribution are the following:
in a number of states a consumer agency (at least similar to and certainly suitable for adjustment
to the requirements of the Rcpc) existed prior to the introduction of the Rcpc – in others, as noted
in the Rcpc, such a public authority had to be introduced or specifically designated;
where consumer authorities do exist, sometimes they operate as an independent agency and
sometimes under the political responsibility of a minister (vis-à-vis parliament). Numerically, the
independent agencies are roughly balanced with the subordinate authorities;
in a number of cases the supervision and enforcement of consumer protection law is, organisa-
tionally speaking, combined with the supervision and enforcement of competition law (such as
in the UK, France and Italy) – in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Rcpc the option of
combining competences in both fields is propagated for those Member States that already have
a public Competition Authority but lack a consumer authority as such.31 
across the Member States substantive law ranges from civil and administrative law to criminal
law. In most countries effective enforcement, in the case of obstruction by the offender, lies with
the courts. Clearly most (existing) authorities distance themselves from individual complaints,
and focus on collective infringements and on the possibility of (support for) class actions. 
2.3. The draft AECP (Act on Enforcement of Consumer Protection)
Grounds
The introduction of the Dutch Consumer Authority is part of a re-evaluation of consumer
protection in the Netherlands. In that sense the draft AECP is not just an implementation of the
Rcpc, but also a response to the deficiencies within the existing legal framework for consumer
protection. The Explanatory Memorandum to the aforementioned draft stipulates three grounds
for this re-evaluation:32
– a strong market should be matched by a strong government;
– major gaps in the legal fabric of existing consumer protection;
– implementing the Rcpc.
Unfortunately, there is no further elucidation of the opinion that strong markets should be
matched by strong governments, so we are left to assume that the Dutch government considers
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33 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
34 Ibid., pp. 6 and 25.
35 E.M.(AECP), supra note 4, p. 3. Also EER.
36 Art. 4 Rcpc, supra note 3,  leaves it to the Member States to decide whether to create a new entity or to assign the new tasks and competences
to an existing entity.
37 The OPTA: the Independent Post and Telecommunications Authority.
38 The AFM: the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets.
39 The NMa: the Netherlands Competition Authority. This is in contrast to, inter alia, the British Office of Fair Trading, which combines
supervision in both areas. 
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this ground to be self-evident. The argumentation that is given in relation to the second ground
may, however, shed some light on this point. 
The gaps or deficiencies in existing consumer protection law that the Dutch government
considers most serious relate to consumer complaints of a collective nature. According to the
Memorandum, research shows that in the Netherlands, during the years 2001-2003, approxi-
mately 10,000 complaints from individuals were lodged with private complaints organisations,
concerning (mainly) collective breaches of consumer law – breaches involving an open group
of consumers. The Dutch government feels that these numbers show that in the cases involved
the individual protection of consumers’ interests is insufficient . Furthermore, collective breaches
require more attention as they disrupt the market and distort equal competition. All in all, it is felt
that a public law response to these collective breaches of consumer protection will benefit the
workings of the markets and thus contribute to economic growth.33 This point also relates to the
view, expressed elsewhere in the Memorandum – and relevant to the ‘strong government vis-à-
vis strong markets’ issue – that public supervision should (and should only) intervene where the
market fails to effectively solve conflicts concerning consumer interests through self-regulatory
or civil law mechanisms for dispute settlement.34 If the market fails to deal with collective
infringements, the government should be sufficiently equipped, such as through a public
supervisor, to act unilaterally and decisively. 
The implementation of the Rcpc may not be the only objective of the draft AECP on the enforce-
ment of consumer protection; it is, however, the primary motive for this new piece of legislation.
Establishing a national Consumer Authority is the ‘piece de resistance’ of the draft and serves to
implement the obligation under the Rcpc to appoint existing or to establish new national authori-
ties which are to take part in a new European network for enforcing Community consumer law
against transboundary collective breaches.35 
The Dutch government has chosen the option of creating a new authority36 because the already
existing supervisory agencies focus on sectoral legislation, such as telecommunications37 and
financial services38, whereas consumer protection requires a more general supervisor. Further-
more, the existing public authorities fulfil a task that is a poor match for consumer protection,
as is considered to be the case with the Netherlands Competition Authority.39
Supervisory framework
The draft AECP offers a new supervisory framework for the enforcement of consumer protection
law. The Dutch Consumer Authority has been designated as the main competent authority (Art.
3 under c and Art. 4, Para. 1) of the Rcpc and has been assigned with the task of enforcing
(implemented) European consumer protection law, with the exception of responding to breaches
related to financial services. Initially, this authority will be a division of the Ministry of Eco-
nomic Affairs, operating under ministerial supervision and responsibility. Ultimately, four years
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40 Art. 9.2, Para. 2 AECP, supra note 4; E.M.(AECP), supra note 4, p. 26.
41 This follows from the fact that the draft AECP distinguishes between sets of rules and regulations that are to be enforced specifically by the
Consumer Authority or by any of the other competent authorities (see a-h in the annex: the Dutch Consumer Authority is only competent
concerning a and b; the other competent authorities are competent concerning c-h).
42 E.M.(AECP), supra note 4, p. 5. 
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after the establishment of the Authority, an evaluation will be made, in order to decide whether
the Authority should be converted into an independent agency.40
Five other, already existing Dutch supervisory agencies are also designated as competent
authorities, with the obligation to execute competences from the Rcpc, in as far as they are
explicitly assigned to them in the draft AECP. These agencies are: the Netherlands Authority for
the Financial Markets, the Netherlands Health Care Inspectorate, the Dutch Media Authority and
the Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority. Whenever one of these (other) authorities is
competent to enforce the pertinent regulations, the Consumer Authority is not.41 Three already
existing supervisory authorities have been designated as ‘other public authorities’ (see Art. 4,
Para. 2 of Rcpc): the Dutch Health Care Authority, the Independent Post and Telecommunica-
tions Authority and the Netherlands Competition Authority belong to this group. In the case of
a concurrence of competences (Article 4.2 of the Rcpc) the draft AECP gives priority to the
existing ‘other authority’ to respond to the breach of consumer protection law. Finally, the draft
AECP allows for the possibility to designate ‘bodies having a legitimate interest in the cessation
or prohibition of intra-Community infringements’ (as mentioned in Art. 4, Para. 2 of the Rcpc).
Non-discrimination and extraterritorial competences
Because the Rcpc is aimed at enforcing laws that have been enacted to prohibit intra-Community
collective infringements of consumer interests, the draft AECP is limited to that scope, with the
exception of the competence of the Consumer Authority to (also) act against relevant infringe-
ments of a non-transboundary nature – Article 2.2 AECP. Thus the draft attempts to ensure that,
in accordance with Consideration no. 5 of the Rcpc, the effectiveness with which infringements
are pursued at the national level does not result in discrimination between national and intra-
Community transactions. As far as the other authorities are concerned, their existing competences
should already suffice for the protection of national transactions – and thus there should be no
danger of discrimination.42
The draft AECP ensures, in Article 1.1, sub. m, that the Dutch Consumer Authority has the
competence also to apply foreign law (this has been introduced to implement Community
consumer law) so as to enable adequate responses to requests for mutual assistance. Naturally,
the aforementioned ‘broadened competence’ of the Consumer Authority only extends to Dutch
consumer law.
Private versus public governance 
EC consumer protection law as referred to in the Rcpc has been largely implemented in the
Netherlands in the Civil Code (CLC). Enforcement is therefore a matter for the civil courts. 
The point of departure of Dutch consumer protection law is that, through and within the law, the
consumer himself is able to enter into a contract and, if necessary, to protect his rights, if need
be by resorting to the courts. Furthermore, consumer organisations of the kind mentioned in
Article 4, Para. 2 Rcpc (‘bodies with a legitimate interest..’), either of Dutch origin or from
abroad, can instigate a class action on the basis of Article 305a and Article 3:305c of the Dutch
Civil Code (CC), demanding – if necessary before the courts – that the consumer rights which
they protect be upheld. Finally, in the Netherlands there are numerous instances of self-regula-
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43 Alternative dispute settlement is an issue that is also supported by the EU; e.g. Commission Recommendation of 4 April 2001, OJ 2001
L 109/56, containing common criteria for consensual out-of-court procedures; the Proposal for a directive on certain aspects of mediation
in civil and commercial matters, 22.10.2004, COM(2004) 718 final; and services such as the European Consumers Centre’s network
(ECC-Net: http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/redress/ecc_network/index_en.htm). 
44 E.M.(AECP), supra note 4, p. 6.
45 Suppliers, providers and sellers.
46 E.M.(AECP), supra note 4, p. 6 and pp. 25 and 28. There is more on this issue in Section 4.1.
47 See also Art. 4, Para. 3 Rcpc, supra note 3.
48 E.M.(AECP), supra note 4, p. 6-7.
49 See also Directive 98/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 1998 on consumer protection in the indication of
the prices of products offered to consumers, OJ 1998 L80/27.
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tion, such as procedures for out-of-court dispute settlement (also known as ‘alternative dispute
resolution’)43 and the joint formulation of general sales conditions.
The Dutch government takes the view that the obligation to establish a consumer authority does
not necessitate a change to the existing civil law and self-regulatory provisions and arrangements.
In fact, the opinion is clearly held that where private consumers are able to manage their own
affairs, public law supervision should not interfere – a standpoint that is referred to as
‘subsidiarity’.44 The responsibility for proper conduct primarily lies with the consumers and
traders45 themselves and should not be shifted to the consumer authority. This authority should
only be called into action when collective consumers’ interests are infringed and the system of
civil law enforcement is unable to generate an effective response.46 
Dual system
The introduction of public law provisions for the supervision and enforcement of civil consumer
law (embedded in the Civil Code) is presented in the draft AECP as a ‘dual system’. The Dutch
government presents this system as an unavoidable consequence of the Rcpc, especially consider-
ing the types of responses and sanctions that Article 4, Para. 6 of the Rcpc prescribes as the
necessary supervisory and enforcement competences of the relevant authority:47 the right of
access to information, to be supplied with information on demand, the right of on-site inspec-
tions, to request that an infringement be terminated, to obtain from the seller or supplier an
undertaking to cease the infringement (and to have this published), to require the cessation or
prohibition of an infringement (and to publish the resulting decisions) and to require payments
for non-compliance. 
These competences are described as rights which can either be exercised by the authority itself
(subject to the possibility of a judicial review), or by requesting an injunction from a competent
court of law.
The Dutch government has chosen to create a new civil procedure to enable the new Consumer
Authority to enforce civil law consumer protection by requesting an injunction at the civil courts.
The alternative, appealing to the administrative courts, could lead to conflicting interpretations
between the civil and administrative courts concerning specific concepts in the Civil Code.
Furthermore, it is felt that administrative enforcement sanctions do not fit in with the protection
of individual rights in the legal relationship between consumers and traders – this is because
administrative sanctions only create a relationship between the Authority and the trader.48 
Where the Consumer Authority (whether or not upon request) finds the necessary grounds to
enforce administrative law consumer protection, such as provisions in the Prices Act (Prijzenwet;
offering, amongst other provisions, a legal basis for prescriptions on the clarity of price lists),49
it will be able to resort to administrative sanctions, which can be appealed against at an adminis-
trative court. Administrative law instruments also apply when the Consumer Authority is
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51 Art. 3, under c Rcpc, supra note 3..
52 This authority was already established prior to the acceptance of the AECP. See the letter by the Undersecretary of Economic Affairs of
1 December 2005.
53 Information exchange may be considered as a third activity – see, amongst others, Arts. 6 and 7 Rcpc, supra note 3.
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involved in merely supervisory activities, such as the above-mentioned access to information or
on-site inspections. 
The dual system amounts to a situation in which supervisory competences in the narrow sense
(enquiries into compliance) are of an administrative nature and where enforcement takes place
with administrative law instruments only if it concerns a breach of public law rules, and with civil
law instruments (especially the new request procedure) when it concerns an infringement of a
rule of civil law.50 
On balance
Thus it seems as if the Dutch government has ‘turned necessity into virtue’ when deciding on the
implementation of the Rcpc. The need to design a ‘competent authority’, responsible for the
application of the Rcpc,51 and to bestow this authority with appropriate competences, has been
combined with the need to fill gaps in consumer protection law, especially with regard to
collective breaches. As a consequence a dual system will come into existence in which public
responsibility and public law instruments are added to an existing, primarily civil law and self-
regulatory enforcement system. Furthermore, it seems that the newly introduced Consumer
Authority52 will be a spider in a web of authorities and ‘bodies with legitimate interest’: on the
one hand, it will play a part in the European network of national consumer authorities while, on
the other, it will have to coordinate and fine-tune its activities with other national supervisory
authorities and with national bodies with a legitimate interest.
Whether this ‘formula’ provides for proper supervisory governance requires us to look closer at
the specific characteristics of the Dutch Consumer Authority, especially with regard to the
concepts of enforcement and supervision. 
3. Characterising the Dutch Consumer Authority
3.1. Core tasks & competences
Supervision and enforcement
The main activities of consumer authorities as envisaged under the Rcpc are enforcement and
supervision.53 Both activities serve to uphold regulation, which in consumer protection law is
mostly laid down in statutes (in the Netherlands mainly in the Civil Code), in statutory orders
and, within the scale of individual legal relations, in administrative acts and contracts (including
policy guidelines and general clauses). Supervision concerns all those activities that are employed
to determine whether a certain conduct infringes existing regulations. Enforcement, in its most
general sense, is involved with mechanisms (including supervision!) which aim to ensure
compliance with existing regulations. Taken in a more restricted sense, enforcement is about
sanctioning unlawful behaviour, with the aim being to punish or to remedy, and to compensate
or remove the (causes of) infringements of existing rules.
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54 See, for a view on the definitions and academic debate on the European level: E. Vos, ‘Reforming the European Commission: what role to
play for EU agencies’, 2000 Common Market Law Review, pp. 1113-1134; R. van Ooik, ‘The growing importance of agencies in the EU:
shifting governance and the institutional balance’, in: D.M. Curtin and R.A. Wessel (eds.), Good Governance and the European Union,
Reflections on concepts, institutions and substance, Antwerp 2005, pp. 125-152; T. Zwart and L.F.M. Verhey (eds.), Agencies in a
comparative and European perspective, Antwerp 2003.
55 White Paper on European Governance, COM(2001) 428 final, OJ 2001 C 287/1, pp. 23-24. We will address the role of national regulators
in applying Community law in Section 4.2.
56 L.F.M. Verhey and N. Verheij, ‘De macht van de marktmeester, Markt toezicht in constitutioneel perspectief’, Handelingen NJV, 2005-I,
Deventer 2005, pp. 135-332 (The power of market regulators. Market supervision in a constitutional perspective), especially pp. 157-162.
57 See Van Ooik, supra note 54, p. 126 and pp. 142-144. Examples are: the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (OHIM; Regulation
40/94/EC of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark, OJ 1994 L 11, p. 1), the Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO; Regulation
2100/94/EC of 27 July 1994 on Community plant variety, OJ 1994 L 227/1), the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products
(EMEA; Regulation 2309/93/EEC of 22 July 1993 laying down Community procedures for the authorization and supervision of medicinal
products for human and veterinary use and establishing a European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products, OJ 1994 L 214/1) and
the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA; Regulation 1592/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2002 on
common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Aviation Safety Agency, OJ 2002 L 240, p. 1).
58 E.M.(AECP), supra note 4, p. 26.
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Regulators
The consumer authorities themselves fall within a broader category of public and private entities
whose ‘raison d’être’ is to enforce and/or supervise. In the case of public offices or agencies, the
term regulators is frequently used once these entities are equipped with powers to take (or
exclusively demand) legally binding decisions and are designated to play a part in supervision…..
and beyond.54 The White Paper on Good European Governance underlines the importance of
these regulators as follows: ‘A range of national regulatory agencies exists across the Member
States in areas with a need for consistent and independent regulatory decisions’.55 
The powers of these regulators may extend well beyond supervisory activities – such as the right
to inspect goods, to search a house or to demand information. In their study on supervision in the
Netherlands, Verhey and Verheij56 found that Dutch regulators are equipped with administrative
powers (to regulate, especially by individual administrative acts, such as licences), with powers
to issue rules (for laying down generally binding norms or policy guidelines), powers to settle
disputes (generally as an optional feature for reaching an out-of-court settlement) and other
powers (especially to issue non-binding rulings, comments or recommendations or to give advice
and present reports on the basis of research, investigations or inspections). Clearly, in practice
the competences of enforcement and supervision tend to ‘overflow’ into and are combined with
other competences, such as regulatory competences and dispute settlement. Matching impres-
sions of an increasing number and variety of powers in the hands of regulators may be found in
the case of European agencies.57 
Considering the competences attributed to both the Dutch and some other national consumer
authorities, we may conclude that enforcement and supervision are clearly their main tasks.
Furthermore, we have found that although in some cases there may be regulatory powers
involved, in many cases legally binding enforcement orders, especially civil injunctions and
criminal penalties, can only be obtained through the courts. That does not rule out, however, that
in some cases, as in the case of the Dutch Consumer Authority, the competence to use administra-
tive sanctions has been bestowed upon the authority and thus, implicitly, the competence to issue
policy guidelines.58 Clearly, however, these regulatory competences do not amount to the power
to adopt new consumer protection rules. 
3.2. Types of supervision
On that final point, we should bear in mind that the tasks of supervision and enforcement, as
assigned to consumer authorities, represent a specific type of supervision. Within the Dutch
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59 BZK Policy Paper, issued by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties), Minder Last,
meer effect. Zes principes van goed toezicht. (Less of a burden, improved effectiveness; six principles of good supervision), October 2005.
Presented by the Minister of the Interior on 12 October 2005.
60 The main difference between the latter two is that public offices reside within the realm of government under political responsibility and
ministerial/parliamentary control, whereas agencies operate on their own account. 
61 Verhey and Verheij, supra note 56, pp. 146-147 (with references).
62 In the Netherlands general competition supervision rests with the Netherlands Competition Authority. Specific supervision rests with specific
agencies for specific areas: the Independent Post and Telecommunications Authority (OPTA), the Directorate for Supervision in Energy
Affairs (DTe) and The Dutch Health Care Authority (NZa). Ideally, once liberalisation has been completed, this type of supervision should
cease and only the general competition supervision should remain.
63 It goes beyond the scope of this article to determine which internal arrangements have possibly been put into place to separate the treatment
of these different domains.
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framework of supervision (also encompassing enforcement)59 a distinction is made between three
types of supervision, linked to three different contexts: of the conduct of citizens and companies,
of the execution of public tasks by agencies and of the execution of public tasks by public
offices.60 
Supervising compliance 
The first context is most relevant for the Consumer Authority. It is described as compliance
supervision, as it focuses on proper adherence to rules of conduct by citizens and companies. This
type of supervision is especially important in the area of the functioning of markets,61 such as
general competition supervision, aimed at safeguarding fair trade in general, and specific
competition supervision, aimed at enhancing the process of the liberalisation of a specific branch
of public services.62
Compliance supervision also includes supervision of market players’ conduct, aimed at ensuring
that market transactions are carried out in conformity with relevant rules of conduct, such as for
financial services (savings, loans, insurances and investments) and for consumer transactions (as
discussed here), and, finally, the supervision of other public interests, aimed at safeguarding the
protection and realisation of specific public interests, such as monetary stability, emission
trading, food safety and access to and the quality of the media.
Clearly the Dutch Consumer Authority has a specific place in the supervision of market players’
conduct. Regulations concerning consumer protection are likely to concern: (a) the need for
transparency or proper information; (b) freedom of choice, having a real choice and being able
to switch from one service provider to another; (c) fair trade, reasonable prices and sales
conditions and the absence of obligatory package sales; (d) possibilities for complaints and
compensation and access to reliable tribunals. 
Supervision by consumer authorities will certainly have to address the above issues, especially
under (a-c) and possibly under (d). 
If we look back at our comparative notes (in Section 2.2) we should consider that in some
countries, such as the United Kingdom and Italy, the legislator has seen fit to combine supervi-
sion of market players’ conduct with general competition supervision.63 Clearly, in the category
of rules of conduct for market players, it is not so much the weighing of the public interest that
is involved, but rather the protection of vulnerable market parties by upholding existing rules.
Supervising the executive
Besides compliance supervision, executive supervision may be relevant to the Consumer
Authority, as it concerns the supervision of ‘good governance’ by more or less independent
agencies involved in the realisation or protection of certain public interests, such as schools,
hospitals and supervisory agencies or regulators. 
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64 Art. 9.2 AECP; E.M.(AECP), supra note 4, p. 26 and 57.
65 For a EU source, see: White Paper, supra note 55, p. 65. For a Dutch source, see: Art. 124 of the Dutch Legislative Drafting Rules;
L.F.M. Verhey, ‘Good Governance: Lessons from Constitutional Law’, in: D.M. Curtin and R.A. Wessel (eds.), Good Governance and the
European Union, Reflections on concepts, institutions and substance, Antwerp 2005, pp. 49-67, notably p. 65; Verhey and Verheij, supra
note 56, p. 203; the BZK Policy Paper, supra note 59, p. 12.
66 By default these are the exclusive ‘offices’ for the execution of national and European regulations; see, for the EU, Van Ooik, supra note 54,
p. 126, and, for the Dutch concept of systemic ministerial responsibility, Verhey and Verheij, supra note 56, pp. 191-192. 
67 Verhey and Verheij, supra note 56, p. 165 and pp. 200-201.
68 E.M.(AECP), supra note 4, p. 26 (there is little experience with public supervision of adherence to civil consumer law).
69 This term may present itself as a neologism. It is the English synonym for the Dutch ‘publicisering’, and stands for a transformation into
public law.
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Generally speaking, executive supervision is a task that lies with politically responsible branches
of government, such as (inspectorates of) ministries (assigned with overall responsibility for a
certain public interest). Presently, the Dutch Consumer Authority is conceptualised as a part of
the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Therefore executive supervision will be a matter of intra-
departmental procedures of management control. Should the Consumer Authority, as is a
possibility in four years time,64 be restructured as an independent agency, as in the case of the
‘sister authorities’ in the United Kingdom, Italy, Ireland and Denmark, then the aspect of
executive supervision will become highly relevant; as the authority will then operate outside
ministerial responsibility, alternative mechanisms of public accountability will have to be
considered. 
The preliminary question, however, is why greater independence on the part of supervisory
authorities would be beneficial. Policy documents present a variety of desiderata, both in terms
of suitable circumstances for or the advantages of creating independent regulators:65 the need for
independent and specific, technical or sectoral expertise; increased visibility of policy activity
and carrying out administrative tasks with a great necessity for public participation; cost saving
and managing large amounts of individual administrative decisions without discretionary
judgements; the possibility for political-executive offices (such as cabinets and the European
Commission – and its members)66 to focus on core issues. Clearly, some of these considerations
strike a chord with consumer authorities.
In the Dutch debate on the choice for independent regulators, with regard to privatisation and
liberalisation the view is held that in the early stages, when there is a greater need for regulation,
supervision should be subject to ministerial responsibility. As liberalisation progresses, less
policy steering is required and the supervisory authorities can be placed outside ministerial
responsibility (and specific supervision could ideally merge into general competition supervi-
sion).67 The same line of reasoning could be applied to supervision by consumer authorities – as
the Dutch government indeed suggests.68 Taking this point even further, one could indeed argue
that as liberalisation becomes fully settled, public supervision and enforcement could be traded
in for private and self-regulatory supervision and enforcement; or at least a mix of supervisory
mechanisms could be applied. In our case of consumer authorities, the backdrop is not so much
liberalisation, but intra-Community protection (and ‘filling in the gaps’); an opposite approach
(to liberalisation) therefore presents itself: ‘publicisation’.69
Inter-executive supervision
The third type of supervision, inter-executive supervision, is concerned with safeguarding ‘good
governance’ in the execution of public tasks by lower public offices. This may well be relevant
to the consumer authorities under the Rcpc, especially when the European Commission super-
vises whether Member States (and their authorities) effectively implement Community regula-
tions, such as the consumer laws in the Annex of the Rcpc.
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Principles of supervision?
In the previously mentioned Dutch BZK paper on principles of good supervision, six general
principles are listed that may also offer an interesting standard for consumer authorities:70
selectivity (if possible, the government should leave supervision and enforcement to civil society
and restrict itself to offering a safety net); decisiveness (supervision should be effective);
cooperation (putting limits on the burden of supervision by improved cooperation between the
manifold supervisors); independency (acting in a trustworthy fashion and independent from
political or other partisan opinions or interests); transparency (giving reasons for supervisory
policies and activities and applying openness); professionalism (on each level of supervision: the
individual supervisor, the supervisory agency and the occupational group; integrity, coherence
and improving competences are the key criteria).
If we apply these principles to the Dutch Consumer Authority at least four important questions
arise: 
1. the draft AECP advocates that the Authority will operate (selectively) as a ‘safety net’, but will
it be able to restrict itself to this role if intra-Community trade increases?
2. Will the cooperation, which is envisaged in agreements between the Dutch Consumer
Authority and other public supervisors and private legitimate bodies, create sufficient trust
among the players and with the consumers to avoid a ‘consumers’ Babylon’?
3. Similarly, will the new system of a European network and national networks create sufficient
transparency to sustain trust and to provide for effectiveness and efficiency?
4. Finally, will the Authority be able to operate independently or is ministerial influence
unavoidable given the vulnerability of the national supervisory network and the liability of the
state vis-à-vis the Community (and how will this affect the quest for professionalism)? 
Clearly these questions require answers, although some may only prove to be answerable in
practice and over time. Now that we have positioned the Consumer Authority within the context
of supervision, the leading question in this contribution remains our only focus. 
4. Governing supervision
How is the new supervisory governance structure of national consumer authorities going to
operate, especially with regard to (1) the concurrence of and coordination between civil law and
administrative law arrangements and (2) the matter of the locus or loci of responsibility for
supervision in light of the Dutch dualism and subsidiarity? 
Each of these two subjects will be addressed separately. The multilevel aspect of these subjects
may be phrased as a cross-cutting question: does top-down European regulation, in this case by
the Rcpc, distort or, instead, support existing national arrangements of civil law and self-regula-
tory enforcement? Another cross-cutting question may be posed by taking the multi-actor
perspective; how can the consumer authority (primarily the Dutch Consumer Authority) coordi-
nate its efforts in and between the European network and the national networks in which it is
involved – especially with a view to the allocation of responsibility and upholding, nationally,
dualism and subsidiarity? 
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71 E.M.(Rcpc), supra note 2, p. 7-8.
72 The same would apply to sanctions, but the Rcpc leaves open (in Art. 4, Para. 4) the possibility of Authorities not being able to apply
sanctions themselves but having the competence to request such sanctions from the courts.
73 Ibid., under no. 34.
74 Ibid.; stating that there is proof that some rogue traders already exploit the gaps in countries without public enforcement.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid., under no. 35.
78 Ibid., under no. 36; the Memorandum goes on to say that there is a possible positive synergy between the consumer protection and
competition dimensions of market surveillance and enforcement.
79 See footnote 43.
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4.1. Coordination between public and private law
The Rcpc (EC Regulation on consumer protection cooperation)
The Rcpc offers little guidance as to the question of the division between civil law and public law
in the area of consumer protection law. In the Explanatory Memorandum, however, some
remarks are made on the question of why a network of public authorities is deemed to be
necessary.71 
First of all, the competences involved in supervising and enforcing Community consumer
protection law need to be unilaterally binding – such as in the case of investigatory powers.72
Furthermore, the use of these powers will require guaranteed confidentiality and professional
secrecy.73 The Memorandum also presents public authorities as having a proven reputation for
speedy, efficient, effective and comprehensive enforcement, which is considered an important
deterrent to rogue traders.74 Impartiality and accountability are presented as being more effective
when authorities act in the public interest than when supervision and enforcement are left to
private entities. Furthermore, mutual assistance depends upon reciprocal rights and obligations
(ensuring effective protection in cross-boundary situations) and reciprocity warrants equivalent
public authorities in each Member State: ‘The mutual assistance rights provided in the regulation
should therefore only be entrusted to public authorities.’75 Private bodies can play their part, but
primarily with regard to domestic consumers. 
Secondly, the Memorandum ascertains that a large majority of the Member States have recog-
nised ‘the value of a public dimension to their enforcement systems’, and it builds on this to
present the creation of a network of public consumers’ authorities at the EU level as a necessary
assurance for Member States to adopt, in the future, the maximum harmonisation of consumer
protection laws (such as the directive on unfair commercial practices) – because ‘consumers will
be protected by equally effective public authorities when shopping cross-border’.76 This point is
also reiterated with regard to the enlargement of the internal market, since the proposed regula-
tion is said to be an opportunity to ensure effective enforcement in the new Member States.
Finally, the Memorandum reminds us77 that because its scope is limited to cross-border infringe-
ments, the regulation does not compel Member States to change their arrangements for domestic
infringements. Furthermore, new public authorities are not necessarily required in those Member
States that currently lack such authorities, because the limited responsibilities of the regulation
could be given to existing public authorities – for instance to public authorities responsible for
the enforcement of competition law matters.78
Clearly, the Rcpc presents a confident choice for public supervision, but it also allows for a
continuation of existing domestic civil law and self-regulatory79 systems of consumer protection
law.
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82
The draft AECP (Act on the Enforcement of Consumer Protection)
So how did the Dutch government take up the challenge? Indeed we have found that enforcing
consumer protection law in the Netherlands is primarily a civil law matter and that the consumer
himself is considered to be capable of protecting his own rights, if need be in an out-of-court
procedure, or in the civil courts. Furthermore, private ‘bodies with a legitimate interest’ may
engage in self-regulatory cooperation with (organisations of) traders, for instance in adopting
general sales conditions, and they may also commence a civil law class action.
The Dutch legislator has adopted the Rcpc view that the obligation to establish a consumer
authority does not necessitate a change in the existing civil law and self-regulatory provisions and
arrangements. Subsidiarity is the key and public supervision should be regarded as a safety net.
Furthermore, a dual system is designed to ensure that (European and additionally national) public
law requirements are met (especially the responses and sanctions prescribed in the Rcpc), without
disturbing the existing fabric of civil consumer law – or rather, expanding on civil law by
creating a new civil injunction procedure (Art. 305d CLC).80
It should be reiterated that the Dutch Consumer Authority only enforces consumer protection law
as listed under a. and b. of the AECP Annex – see Article 2.2, Para. 1 AECP. This annex lists
both the relevant regulations and directives and concerning the latter also the statutes by which
these directives were implemented. 
The regulations under a., which are all directives, have been implemented in the CLC and are
enforced through civil law means, such as the new and speedy civil procedure of a request for
an injunction (Art. 2.5) and the right to request a civil court to declare that agreements on class-
compensation for damages (to which the Dutch Consumer Authority is a party) are generally
binding.81 The main subjects of civil law protection are misleading advertising,82 travel arrange-
ments, general sales conditions, time-sharing arrangements, distant sales, consumer sales and
guarantees and, finally, e-commerce. 
The regulations under b., again only directives, are implemented in public law statutes: the Act
on door-to-door or street sales (or hawking) and the Prices Act. These can only be enforced
through administrative law enforcement; on demand for mutual assistance with regard to an intra-
Community breach of consumer protection law (Art. 2.7, Para. 3).83 The main administrative
instruments are: the administrative order subject to a penalty (Art. 2.8), the administrative penalty
(Art. 2.9) and the public announcement on the use of one or both of these sanctions84 and of
refraining from such use on the basis that an undertaking by the trader has been agreed upon (Art.
2.16).85
The administrative law supervisory competences apply generally, regardless of whether a
(suspected) infringement concerns civil or public consumer protection law. Article 2.4 AECP
regulates the appointment of civil servants as supervisory officials and, once appointed, these
officials are equipped with the supervisory powers listed in the General Administrative Law Act.
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88 E.M.(AECP), supra note 4, p. 28 and p. 47.
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90 Coordinating efforts to curb collective infringements.
91 Ibid. (also p. 49).
92 E.M.(AECP), supra note 4, p. 50. With reference to a report by the Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy: Visie op markttoezicht
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The dual system preserves the existing system of mainly civil law consumer protection (through
self-regulation), while adding instruments for intra-Community infringements. The Consumer
Authority is built, as the Explanatory Memorandum puts it,86 on a ‘civil foundation’. Apart from
individual consumers being considered to be able to stand up for their own rights, this foundation
is the result of consumers organising themselves (or being organised), such as in the Consumers’
Association (Consumentenbond). Together with (organisations representing) traders these
consumers’ organisations have adopted self-regulatory arrangements and organisations, such as
the Dutch Advertising Code Foundation and the Consumer Complaints Foundation,87 which are
important players in dealing with consumers’ complaints. Furthermore, the consumer organisa-
tions, as ‘bodies with a legitimate interest’ may commence class actions in the case of a collec-
tive infringement of consumer protection law.
Given this ‘civil foundation’ the Dutch government has formulated the subsidiarity principle.
Outside a request for mutual assistance, this principle means that the Consumer Authority will
only act: (1) in the case of collective breaches of consumer protection law and (2) when the
market seems incapable of enforcing consumer protection law through self-regulation or civil
procedures.88 Especially the second requirement, which expresses the subsidiarity principle,
requires some mode of cooperation between the Consumer Authority and the domain of private
(collective consumer) initiatives. To this effect the AECP offers three important public-private
arrangements.
Firstly, the AECP facilitates, in Article 6.1, the adoption of so-called cooperation protocols for
bilateral agreements between, on the one hand, the Consumer Authority and, on the other ,
consumers’ organisations and joint organisations of consumers and traders (such as the previ-
ously mentioned foundations). These protocols may be about offering information to consumers
(referring to proper information offices), dispute settlement,89 making use of the instrument of
class actions and the (new) injunction request procedure,90 as well as exchanging information on
new developments and trends.91
Secondly, the AECP obliges (in Article 6.3) the Consumer Authority to set up institutionalised
social deliberations, at least once every three months, with organisations representing consumers
and traders, as a means to coordinate the Consumer Authority’s task of executing the AECP with
private initiatives and to exchange information about developments and trends relevant to
consumer protection. Apart from their direct practical use, these deliberations are considered an
important aspect of providing accountability towards stakeholders; not only should the Consumer
Authority be accountable through the mechanism of ministerial responsibility, but also – in terms
of good governance – through public accountability.92 
Thirdly and finally, but this time within the scope of mutual assistance, as proposed in Article
8, Para. 3 Rcpc, the competent authorities may decide to involve ‘legitimate bodies’ in the
process of mutual assistance. Art. 6.2 AECP takes up this ‘challenge’ by allowing for the
possibility of designating such bodies by statutory order. In fact, the Dutch Advertising Code
Foundation already fulfils a task in the implementation of the Television without frontiers
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95 Ibid., pp. 30-31.
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directive,93 for which the European Commission has accepted self-regulation as a proper means
of implementation, which may now be continued under the AECP. Thus the subsidiarity principle
can also operate under mutual assistance, albeit that the competences of the competent authority
will remain in place should the ‘legitimate body’ fail in its response to the request (see also
Article 8, Para. 3, final phrase Rcpc).94
As these arrangements give operational meaning to the subsidiarity principle, they will relate to
the possible use of civil law instruments by private parties as against the possibility of the
Consumer Authority using its competences. As to the latter, the arrangements will have a bearing
both on civil law and on administrative law instruments. When subsidiarity prevails, civil law
instruments, in the hands of private parties, will also prevail; once a Consumer Authority
intervention is considered unavoidable, the choice of instruments depends on the nature of the
regulations that the rogue trader has (probably) infringed. Clearly, when a request for mutual
supervisory assistance has been made, the likelihood of administrative law instruments being
used increases. Firstly, it may well prove difficult for a branch organisation to design self-
regulatory, yet binding mechanisms that commit individual traders to provide information.
Secondly, once the Consumer Authority does have to step in, it will only have administrative law
supervisory instruments at its disposal. 
Towards publicisation?
While preparing the draft AECP, the ful-publicisation of Dutch consumer protection law was
considered as an alternative to the dual system.95 All public and civil consumer protection law
would be enforced by administrative law. A clear advantage would have been that all supervision
and enforcement would be ‘in one pair of hands’. It would have required, however, a full
regulatory overhaul – transposing all civil law remedies into administrative legislation. Further-
more, ful-publicisation would end the benefits of the existing predominantly civil law and self-
regulatory system (vide ‘the private foundation’). Finally, such a fundamental transformation
would pose a considerable risk of having both the civil courts and the administrative courts
interpreting and applying concepts and provisions of the Civil Code differently and thus creating
legal uncertainty.96 
Possible strains
So, the dual system has prevailed and in theory it offers a clear distinction, linked to different sets
of civil or public consumer protection regulations. In practice, though, this separation of regimes
may be difficult to manage when intra-Community trade intensifies and, subsequently, the
number of requests for mutual assistance increases – with more speedy transactions through the
Internet. Both foreign and domestic partners in supervision and enforcement may then expect the
Consumer Authority to respond more rapidly and with more effective and efficient instruments –
if need be with administrative orders, even when private consumer law is at stake, or by disre-
garding possible self-regulatory options. This may lead to a strain on the domestic cooperation
between the Consumer Authority and other public and private partners. 
In four years time the functioning of the dual system will be subject to an evaluation (Art. 9.2
AECP), also with regard to the cooperation within the domestic network. Should the dual
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97 E.M.(AECP), supra note 4, p. 52 (and pp. 72-73).
98 Ibid., Chapter 4, pp. 24-30. 
99 Art. 3, under d Rcpc, supra note 3, and Art. 2.3, Para. 1 AECP, supra note 4.
100 Art. 3, under b Rcpc, supra note 3, and Art. 2.2 AECP, supra note 4; E.M.(AECP), supra note 4, p. 30-31. 
101 Ibid., p. 27-28.
102 Art. 6, 7, 8 and 9 Rcpc, supra note 3.
103 See also Art. 3.11 AECP (the duty to provide relevant information), supra note 4. All competent authorities are under an obligation to respond
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105 E.M.(AECP), supra note 4, pp. 27-28.
106 Required on the basis of Article 11, Paras. 2 and 3 Rcpc, supra note 3.
107 E.M.(AECP), supra note 4, pp. 42-43.
108 Ibid., p. 43.
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enforcement system prove more burdensome than the (expected) disadvantages of a transforma-
tion into a public law system, then a fundamental transformation is still on the cards.97 
4.2. Responsibility
Working in networks
Clearly, the element of the new networks of public and private partners in supervising and
enforcing consumer protection law is an important feature of the new system. Considering the
three main tasks of the Consumer Authority98 (the single liaison office,99 the main supervisory and
enforcement authority100 and – outside legal tasks – the Information office for consumers and
traders),101 the relations with other liaison offices,102 other competent authorities,103 other public
offices104 and with legitimate bodies105 are of the utmost importance. In fact, these relations
emerge as networks, as there is a structural need (within or outside requests for mutual assis-
tance) to coordinate the use of supervisory and enforcement powers, as well as to exchange or
share information on relevant trends and developments in consumer law (practice). 
Firstly, there is the European network of public authorities, set up according to rules which
follow directly from the Rcpc, especially from Articles 6-9 (obligations) and Articles 11-15
(responsibilities and conditions). 
Secondly, there are several domestic networks with other competent authorities, with other public
offices and with legitimate bodies. These are regulated in part by provisions of the AECP (Art.
2.17, Art. 3.11, Art. 4.3-4 and Art. 6.3)106 and by agreements laid down in the previously
mentioned cooperation protocols. According to Article 5.1 and Article 6.1 AECP, nationally
these cooperation protocols are to be formulated for coordination and cooperation between all
the competent authorities, offices and bodies, also with regard to the interpretation of certain
legal concepts and terms and to the application of provisions of consumer protection law.107
Especially with regard to mutual assistance, but also in other cases of coordinated efforts, some
measure of agreement will be necessary. Article 4.3 AECP states that on the terms and concepts
of civil law coordination suffices (as, finally, the courts will authoritatively decide on the matters
in question); but in the case of terms and concepts of administrative law, agreement is necessary
(as public office has a primary right of interpretation).108 In both cases these joint interpretations
will be of great importance to the practice of supervision and enforcement. 
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Taking responsibility
A major concern is how public responsibility for consumer protection is distributed through these
different networks, especially with regard to positioning the Consumer Authority in a dual system
operating on the basis of subsidiarity. Clearly, the Consumer Authority embodies the hybrid
character of the new Dutch supervisory governance in consumer protection law. 
On the one hand, the Consumer Authority is part of a vertical/hierarchical governance system,
in which public law competences and public responsibility dominate (nationally, the Dutch
Minister for Economic Affairs and, on the EU level, the European Commission).
On the other hand, the Consumer Authority takes part in a horizontal/reciprocal governance
system, in which it interacts in a non-hierarchical manner with other public and private supervi-
sors and legitimate bodies, both on the European and on the national level. 
In this hybrid governance context,109 public responsibility needs to be in tune with the require-
ments of subsidiarity and dualism, or with the view that the Consumer Authority must provide
intra-Community safeguards, whilst at the same time allowing for market relations to self-
regulate consumer-trader relations and to offer an out-of-court system for the settlement of
conflicts – in other words: limiting its interventions to situations of collective market failure. 
In two respects attuning (vertical) public responsibility to (horizontal) networking may prove
difficult. Firstly, it may be too difficult to give the Consumer Authority sufficient room to operate
as an independent actor within the ‘horizontal/reciprocal’ national networks and to take part in,
or to assist in the workings of the self-regulatory consumer protection system,110 instead of the
Consumer Authority being placed outside these networks, because it is primarily seen as part of
the ‘public law regulatory machinery’ – as a result of the influence of the mechanism of ministe-
rial responsibility.
Secondly, there may be insufficient safeguards to avoid that operating within the European
network, under the responsibility of the European Commission, places the Consumer Authority
(as part of the ‘public law EU machinery’) outside the national scope of subsidiarity and dualism
(and operating rather as a countervailing power under EU responsibility as against Member
States’ discretion).
In both respects it seems appropriate to place the Consumer Authority outside vertical regulation
(both under European and under national responsibility). At the same time it may be necessary
to underline the importance of national discretion, under ministerial responsibility, so as to
protect the typically Dutch system of consumer protection against unwanted (further)
publicisation. 
Responsibility and the national networks 
As specific competences are attributed to the Dutch Consumer Authority, it will be able to act
according to its own specific supervisory and enforcement powers, i.e. according to its own legal
authority.111 Organisationally it belongs to the Ministry of Economic Affairs, as a separate
division directly under the Secretary-General.112 Thus, on the one hand, the Authority has its own
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113 With the aim of ensuring its independence and for the sake of transparency. Note that within the Authority itself an organisational division
will be made between supervision, sanctioning and administrative reviews. See E.M.(AECP), supra note 4, p. 28.
114 Art. 2.1, Para. 1 AECP, supra note 4; E.M.(AECP), supra note 4, p. 25-26.
115 An evaluation, also of the organisational aspects, is due in four years. See Art. 9.2, Para. 2 AECP, supra note 4; E.M.(AECP), supra note
4, p. 26 and p. 57.
116 BZK Policy Paper, supra note 59, p. 16. In fact, examples of executive supervision (see Section 3.2, under b.).
117 Verhey and Verheij, supra note 56, pp. 191-192.
118 In doing so too readily (to the liking of the Minister) the Consumer Authority could be confronted with a disciplinary response from the
minister; but, legally speaking, the decision taken will still ‘stand’. 
119 E.M.(AECP), supra note 4, p. 26; especially by refraining from specific instructions (in individual cases).
120 E.M.(AECP), supra note 4,  pp. 26-27 and pp. 44-45. The protocols with other competent authorities and with other public offices will have
to be agreed upon with other ministers or with boards of independent government agencies.
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powers and is – formally speaking – detached from the policy-making (regulatory) divisions113
while, on the other hand, full ministerial responsibility continues to apply.114
In contrast to ‘full ministerial responsibility’, ‘limited ministerial responsibility’ applies in cases
of public services rendered by independent agencies – as in the future may also be the case for
the Dutch Consumer Authority.115 Under Dutch law there are two avenues through which a
minister can exert his powers concerning such independent agencies. Firstly, on the basis of
specific competences that a minister often still retains, such as the ability to appoint and dismiss
officials, the right of approval or dismissal concerning the agency’s decisions, the power over the
funding and budget of the agency and powers to intervene when the agency seriously neglects
its responsibilities.116 Secondly, the minister is still considered to retain a so-called systemic
responsibility. This responsibility is based on his or her ability to take the initiative towards the
adoption of new legislation concerning the supervisory and enforcement framework within which
the agency operates.117
Presently, these different competences and responsibilities need not be separated, as there is full
ministerial responsibility over the Consumer Authority. This allows the minister to issue
instructions, not only of a general nature (in the form of policy guidelines) but also specific
instructions (pertaining to one particular case). As for the use of policy guidelines, under Dutch
law an administrative office is allowed to set these rules aside if in a particular case acting in
conformity with such a rule would result in a disproportional disadvantage.118 Naturally, this also
applies to the Consumer Authority. Furthermore, the fact that specific supervisory and enforce-
ment competences have been assigned to the Consumer Authority, instead of to the minister,
confirms that the Consumer Authority should be able to act, as far as possible, of its own accord,
as it also implies that – under Dutch law – the Consumer Authority is allowed to also adopt its
own policy guidelines. In practice the minister should make full responsibility ‘feel’ like limited
responsibility.119
At the same time it should be well understood that all other competences pertaining to the
Consumer Authority – such as the annual report to the European Commission and the signing of
cooperation protocols with other supervisors and with legitimate bodies – rest explicitly with the
minister! That is to say that the willingness to cooperate and the conditions for cooperation are
to be agreed upon by the minister.120 
So, with regard to operating in horizontal, national networks, we may conclude that the bound-
aries are set by the minister and the use of the Authority’s (own) competences will have to be in
accordance with certain protocols. Not only for strictly legal reasons, but also to avoid the
situation where the necessary trust in making these reciprocal networks work will be undermined.
By the same token, the minister should aim to arrive at cooperation protocols that allow for
sufficient discretion, so as to offer the Consumer Authority sufficient opportunity to create trust
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within the network. Finding the proper balance between regulation and discretion will be a major
challenge – in fact regardless of whether full or limited ministerial responsibility applies. 
Responsibility and the European network
The Rcpc has the legal provisions on mutual assistance and cooperation in the European network
– in Articles 6-15. In the course of cooperative practice, further, more specific conditions for
issuing and handling requests for mutual assistance, or for the sake of information exchange, may
be developed. These informal agreements may interfere with both the ministerial influence on
the Consumer Authority and with the specific features of Dutch consumer protection law
(subsidiarity and dualism); indeed all the more so if and when the European Commission actively
participates in the network (either within or outside the boundaries of Arts 16-17 Rcpc). 
On the face of it, the Community’s (or Commission’s) role in this context is limited to supporting
measures which raise the standard of enforcement generally and which improve the ability of
consumers to enforce their rights (promoting the exchange of best practices).121 The network
should be complementary to existing enforcement mechanisms.122 Still, setting a course of action
in support of cooperation and of the coordinated effort of supervision and enforcement may
involve exchanges of officials between the competent authorities, national actions on informa-
tion, advice and education, consumer representation, the extrajudicial settlement of disputes,
access to justice and statistics. Clearly, agreement on these issues may have a strong effect on the
workings of consumer authorities. The Community’s impact could reach even further when
partners within the network, including the Commission, jointly decide upon the applicability or
interpretation and application of (intra-)Community consumer law. 
Such a development may give rise to the question whether (nationally) ministerial responsibility
for the Consumer Authority will still be able to function effectively. This question has also arisen
in the wake of a number of similar networks that have been created over the last decade,123 such
as in: telecommunications,124 energy,125 food safety,126 monetary policy127 and general competition
supervision.128 In some networks the Commission even has the explicit power to take decisions
which are binding on network participants.129 Although this is not the case in the Consumer
Authority’s network, the Commission may nevertheless still see fit to present recommendations
or guidelines, by which the authorities and the Member States have to abide – in view of Article
10 EC Treaty (the principle of loyalty). This may well curtail the possibility for a minister to
(nationally) influence the behaviour of the Consumer Authority by means of policy guidelines
or otherwise, whilst at the same time Member States may still be held liable for the failure, by
their own – subordinate – authority, to enforce Community legislation.130 131
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Furthermore, the possibilities for upholding the typically Dutch system of consumer protection
(especially subsidiarity and dualism), may come under threat, as a European regulation overrules
national responsibilities. 
 
Legitimacy and trust
The legitimacy of decision-making in European networks of supervisors, also considering the
role of the Commission within these networks, is questionable. Some authors even speak of a
clear danger that (formally or de facto) independent agencies will gradually be ‘sucked out of
their national institutional structures’, without there being proper democratic compensation
within the networks.132 The opportunity to introduce horizontal or alternative means of account-
ability, such as being directly accountable to Parliament, stakeholders’ participation,133 and active
openness may be worthwhile manifestations of ‘good governance’134 and thus soften democratic
vulnerability, but they can hardly be expected to offer full compensation.135 
This viewpoint should be taken into consideration when the European Consumers’ Network kicks
off, especially as a shift towards European dominance may well put national attempts at preserv-
ing and building upon ‘civil foundations’ at risk.136 The Rcpc is presented as a framework that
allows for national consumer protection schemes to retain their specific characteristics. If this is
to be taken seriously, the European network definitely needs to restrain itself and, nationally,
authorities should ideally operate as agencies, as this offers them the opportunity to interact with
public and private ‘partners’ on a reciprocal basis. Setting the ground rules for such reciprocity
and interaction could and should remain a ministerial responsibility. This responsibility would
serve to uphold national choices against possible European policy dominance through the
agencies as parties to the European network. At the same time this responsibility should not be
taken up to over-regulate cooperation protocols, as this could easily be seen as placing little trust
in the Consumer Authority. Smart regulation is clearly required in order to find the right balance.
5. In conclusion
How is this new supervisory governance structure of consumer authorities going to operate,
particularly with regard to the coordination between civil and administrative law and the division
of responsibility for supervision in a system of dualism and subsidiarity? In the above text this
leading question has given rise to many elements and aspects, questions and possible answers.
As always, ‘the proof of the pudding is in the eating.’ Nevertheless there are – unfortunately –
already some signs that call for caution. Finding the proper balance in policy practice may prove
difficult; multilevel cooperation should not infringe on domestic systemic discretion and
ministerial responsibility, but at the same time, nationally, ministerial responsibility should not
infringe on the authorities’ capacity to enter into reciprocal networks which are of critical
importance in upholding subsidiarity and dualism. This challenge may well prove to be too
difficult and lead to a ‘regulatory overstretch’137 and a subsequent lack of transparency and the
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danger of a failure to create trust, effectiveness and efficiency. Both cross-cutting questions,
related to our leading question, serve to illustrate these concerns. 
The first cross-cutting, multilevel, question was whether top-down European regulation, in this
case by the Rcpc, distorts or supports existing national arrangements of civil law and self-
regulatory enforcement. The answer may well be that the regulation seems to offer support in that
it allows for a dual system and subsidiarity, as introduced by the Dutch government. Nonetheless
the dual system may well prove to be insufficiently resilient in the wake of increasing and speedy
intra-Community trading implementation, causing pressure to apply a ready ‘administrative fix’
to newly arising infringements, surpassing civil law and self-regulatory alternatives, all in neglect
of subsidiarity. A considerable amount of trust is placed in the good governance of the relevant
networks. 
The second cross-cutting, multi-actor, question is how the Dutch Consumer Authority may
successfully coordinate its efforts in and between the European network and the national
networks in which it is involved. Good governance may be the stepping-stone to achieve trust,
but ministerial overregulation or a lack of transparency is the pitfall. If the basic rules for taking
responsibility and the division of powers to take binding decisions remain unclear or offer too
little room for the Authority to (reciprocally) involve itself, commitment within the networks may
fall short of the promise of rapid, efficient and effective supervision and enforcement. 
To keep the Consumer Authority initially under ‘ministerial wings’ is a good decision if the
opportunity is seized to create ‘hard and fast rules’ for both vertical and horizontal coordination.
Nevertheless, if the proper and intricate mix of reciprocity and transparency cannot be achieved,
full publicisation of Dutch collective consumer protection law may well prove the better
alternative – given the requirements set by the European Community. 
All of the changes caused by the Rcpc will probably serve the intra-Community protection of
consumer law. There should, however, be serious concern about the likelihood that these changes
will indeed disrupt those national systems of consumer protection which, presently, offer
protection through civil law and self-regulation. All the parties concerned, the Commission
included, will have to show their willingness to invest in ‘working together’ on the basis of trust
and transparency. Should this fail, regardless of the Rcpc’s intentions, a (protracted) transition,
within these Member States, to a system of administrative law enforcement against collective
infringements of consumer law and a withdrawal of civil society involvement can be expected
